best casino bonuses australian online casino au dollars trusted online gambling internet casino download old information online us casinos las vegas best online casino craps flash casino games mac play online vegas

Get Our Newsletter



Links

Columnists



Site Search


Entire (RSS)
Comments (RSS)

Archive Calendar

April 2016
S M T W T F S
« Mar    
 12
3456789
10111213141516
17181920212223
24252627282930

Guides

How to Become a Bounty Hunter



Tag: supreme court

Supreme Court to Decide Whether to Help FBI Hack into More Computers

hacking By Steve Neavling
ticklethewire.com

The U.S. Supreme Court is expected to rule in favor of a Justice Department request that would allow judges to issue search warrants so that law enforcement agencies have the access to computers in any jurisdiction.

Currently, magistrate judges are limited to ordering searches within the jurisdiction of their court, Reuters reports. 

The change would help federal agencies like the FBI hack into more computer networks, a concern of some tech companies and the ACLU

If a judge approves the change, both chambers of Congress would have to approve it.

Parker: April Supreme Court Cases Include Conviction of Ex-Virginia Gov. Bob McDonnell

Ross Parker was chief of the criminal division in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Detroit for 8 years and worked as an AUSA for 28 in that office.

By Ross Parker
ticklehthewire.com

The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in four difficult criminal cases on the April docket. All without the incisive, biting and entertaining interrogation of Justice Scalia. But last month Justice Thomas asked his first question in more than a decade. That must have raised some eyebrows.

Ross Parker

Ross Parker

One of the highest profile cases of the term, McDonnell v. United States, will be among those argued. Bob McDonnell was the popular governor of Virginia, and his name had been mentioned as a Vice Presidential running mate. Probably not any more since his prosecution for bribery.

His financial problems led him and his wife to seek various loans and gifts valued at over $175,000 from a businessman who was promoting a dietary supplement under review by the FDA. The gifts included a $20,000 shopping spree by Mrs. McDonnell, a former Washington Redskins cheerleader. Not that I hold anything against former cheerleaders (some of my best friends…), but she does seem to be at the center of both the “quid” and the “quo” of this sordid affair.

The issue before the Court is whether the Hobbs Act felony of agreeing to take “official action” in exchange for something of value by exercising actual government power (i.e. bribery) was proven in the case, as opposed to merely providing routine political courtesies, benefits and access to others.

Ex-Gov. Bob McDonnell

Ex-Gov. Bob McDonnell

The evidence at trial included the following “official acts” by the governor, all around the time that the McDonnells were receiving their goodies: asking the Secretary of Health to send an aide to a meeting where Mrs. McDonnell and the businessman could pitch the product; attending a luncheon arranged by Mrs. McDonnell where  the businessman gave two state medical schools $200,000 to research the product; sending an ambiguous email (at Mrs McDonnell’s request) to a staffer regarding the medical school’s lack of responsiveness; inviting the businessman to a reception for the “Health Care Leaders”; and finally suggesting a meeting to discuss whether the product could be included in the state employee health plan. Note the First Lady’s involvement. Cherchez la femme

None of these actions by the governor resulted in any specific benefit to the businessman. Nor did the governor make any request or order that a government official do anything other than exercise his/her independent judgment. McDonnell said that he was doing nothing more than helping a state business and extending political courtesies.

The Solicitor General argues that at least some of the actions amounted to personal benefits conferred in exchange for an agreement to influence government matters. But McDonnell’s supporters filed more than a dozen briefs which warn that the expansion of the statute to include this kind of conduct will create an ill-defined situation where aggressive federal prosecutors could criminalize what has been merely political custom.

Read more »

Supreme Court Declines to Consider Case Involving Random Detention of Motorists Near U.S. Borders

US_Supreme_CourtBy Steve Neavling
ticklethewire.com

The Supreme Court on Monday announced it would not consider a case involving limits on random detention of motorists within 100 miles of a border.

The case involves an Air Force officer, Richard Rynearson, who was detained for 34 minutes at a Border Patrol checkpoint in Uvalde County, Texas, despite authorities having no suspicion that he was an undocumented immigrant or criminal, Reason.com reports. 

In a 1976 decision in the United States v. Martinez Fuerte, the Supreme Court concluded random stops at immigration checkpoints did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The justices reasoned that each stop “involves only a brief detention of travelers” during which “all that is required of the vehicle’s occupants is a response to a brief question or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States.”

The court had said “the average length of an investigation in the secondary inspection area is three to five minutes.”

Supreme Court Oral Arguments in March, With An Empty Seat on the Bench

Justice Antonin Scalia

Justice Antonin Scalia

By Ross Parker
ticklethewire.com

When counsel approach the lectern in the Supreme Court for oral argument during the rest of the term, instead of facing the blistering questions of the Court’s most aggressive inquisitor, they will instead see an empty chair among the nine on the bench, draped with a black sash. One of the Court’s most active and entertaining interrogators has bedeviled his last lawyer. There will be less laughter in the courtroom.

Justice Antonin Scalia died on February 13, 2016, one month shy of his eightieth birthday. Befitting his colorful life, it was after a day of quail hunting in West Texas. Although the politicians are rumbling about his successor and the conspiracy theorists whispering about the circumstances of his death, it was in all likelihood a peaceful death after an active life of purpose, whether you agree with his brand of conservatism or not.

In criminal cases, he generally supported the government. Along with Justice Thomas, he was unapologetically pro-death penalty, whether the defendant was under-age, mentally retarded, or subject to a botched execution. After all, those were all legal in 1791 when the 8th Amendment was ratified. He also labored to overrule the Warren revolution of cases restricting the police, especially Miranda v. Arizona.

But he could vote for the defendant, too, especially in areas involving jury trial rights and the traditional authority of trial judges. His Booker opinion ended mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. And Apprendi v. Arizona stopped judge-decided facts leading to sentence enhancements. He also was protective against the reach of technology. In Kylio he authored the opinion requiring search warrants for thermal imaging searches. Marijuana grow lights became a bit more private.

Despite his sometimes angry and outrageous vitriol during argument and in his opinions, he was by all accounts well liked by his colleagues on the bench and the staff. He was one of a kind and his death diminishes the energy and vivacity of the institution.

Without Justice Scalia’s contributions, the Court will consider two criminal cases during its March oral arguments. Betterman v. Montana raises one of those issues that you would have thought had already been decided — whether the 6th Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial applies to the sentencing phase. Are defendants protected against inordinate delay in the final disposition of sentence by the 6th Amendment?

The defendant pled guilty to bail jumping after he failed to appear for sentencing on a domestic assault conviction. He explained that he did not have transportation from Butte to the courthouse in Billings. He eventually sobered up enough to turn himself in to the county jail, where he remained for 14 months when he was finally sentenced to 7 years consecutive to his 5 year sentence for assault, with no credit for time served. Don’t go in the wind in Montana after beating up your spouse.

The Montana Supreme Court held that Speedy Trial does not apply to sentence delays, only due process. Although the court found the delay to be unacceptable and attributable to the state, the prejudice shown by the defendant, delaying rehabilitative programs and other benefits in prison compared to the county jail, was speculative and insufficient.

The prosecution argues that the issue is more properly one of due process and that the burden of proof of prejudice is on the defendant.

When the 6th Amendment was ratified in the late 18th Century, most penalties were fixed and were imposed immediately after the verdict or within a few days. Today’s sometimes extended sentence proceedings and alternatives have changed that process considerably. Because over 95% of the defendants plead guilty, the period from conviction to sentence has become the most crucial and litigated phase of the proceeding. Delays which impair the ability to defend oneself, as well as other rehabilitative resources and requirements, can significantly affect a defendant’s eligibility to someday become a free person.

To a large extent the question becomes, what does “trial” mean in the context of the 6th Amendment – the proceeding determining guilt or innocence, or the entire proceeding to the entry of judgment at sentencing. Did the Founders actually intend that the right is one of Speedy Justice, much like the other 6th Amendment right to a public trial (which extends to sentence)?

Likewise whose responsibility is it to prove the presence or absence of prejudice from delays, the defendant’s or the state’s?

Prediction: This presents a close question, probably made closer by Justice Scalia’s absence. I believe the Court will extend the 6th Amendment to the sentencing phase and it will also find prejudice in this case.

The other case scheduled for oral argument in March is Welch v. United States. The issued posed is whether in a habeas case a Florida conviction for “robbery sudden snatching” qualifies as a predicate for Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) sentence enhancement. A preliminary question is whether the Court’s opinion last term in Johnson v United States should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.

The Armed Career Criminal Act subjects a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm to a longer sentence if he has 3 prior convictions which are either:  a violent felony (involving the use or threatened use of force): one of 4 named felonies (burglary, arson, extortion or use of explosives); or otherwise involves conduct which presents a potential risk of physical injury. Johnson invalidated this last option, called the residual clause as being void for vagueness.

To qualify Welch’s prior convictions of robbery sudden snatching must satisfy the “force” requirement of the first option—if Johnson is retroactive. There seems to be a serious question of whether the Florida statute requires force as an element. If not, the defendant would not have the requisite 3 predicate convictions.

The government’s argument is that, if the Court makes Johnson retroactive, it should remand the case to the 11th Circuit to determine this question. The defendant argues that this issue is “readily apparent” and that the Court should reverse.

Prediction: The Court will hold that Johnson is retroactive. The issue is substantive, not procedural, and involves a new rule of constitutional law involving the range of conduct and class of persons which the law punishes. I am not sure the record has completely explored the issue of the Florida statute’s elements. It makes more sense for a lower court to determine this question in its first instance. I think the Court will remand to consider this question.

Despite frequent differences with Justice Scalia’s holdings and judicial philosophy, I feel a real sense of his loss by his passing. His contribution to the evolution to the rule of law and the operation of the highest Court was unique. He was a force of nature who had a set of brass ones.

Parker: Supreme Court Oral Arguments in March, With An Empty Seat On the Bench

Ross Parker was chief of the criminal division in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Detroit for 8 years and worked as an AUSA for 28 in that office.

Ross Parker

Ross Parker

By Ross Parker
ticklethewire.com

When counsel approach the lectern in the Supreme Court for oral argument during the rest of the term, instead of facing the blistering questions of the Court’s most aggressive inquisitor, they will instead see an empty chair among the nine on the bench, draped with a black sash. One of the Court’s most active and entertaining interrogators has bedeviled his last lawyer. There will be less laughter in the courtroom.

Justice Antonin Scalia died on February 13, 2016, one month shy of his eightieth birthday. Befitting his colorful life, it was after a day of quail hunting in West Texas. Although the politicians are rumbling about his successor and the conspiracy theorists whispering about the circumstances of his death, it was in all likelihood a peaceful death after an active life of purpose, whether you agree with his brand of conservatism or not.

In criminal cases, he generally supported the government. Along with Justice Thomas, he was unapologetically pro-death penalty, whether the defendant was under-age, mentally retarded, or subject to a botched execution. After all, those were all legal in 1791 when the 8th Amendment was ratified. He also labored to overrule the Warren revolution of cases restricting the police, especially Miranda v. Arizona.

But he could vote for the defendant, too, especially in areas involving jury trial rights and the traditional authority of trial judges. His Booker opinion ended mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. And Apprendi v. Arizona stopped judge-decided facts leading to sentence enhancements. He also was protective against the reach of technology. In Kylio he authored the opinion requiring search warrants for thermal imaging searches. Marijuana grow lights became a bit more private.

Justice Antonin Scalia

Justice Antonin Scalia

Despite his sometimes angry and outrageous vitriol during argument and in his opinions, he was by all accounts well liked by his colleagues on the bench and the staff. He was one of a kind and his death diminishes the energy and vivacity of the institution.

Without Justice Scalia’s contributions, the Court will consider two criminal cases during its March oral arguments. Betterman v. Montana raises one of those issues that you would have thought had already been decided — whether the 6th Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial applies to the sentencing phase. Are defendants protected against inordinate delay in the final disposition of sentence by the 6th Amendment?

The defendant pled guilty to bail jumping after he failed to appear for sentencing on a domestic assault conviction. He explained that he did not have transportation from Butte to the courthouse in Billings. He eventually sobered up enough to turn himself in to the county jail, where he remained for 14 months when he was finally sentenced to 7 years consecutive to his 5 year sentence for assault, with no credit for time served. Don’t go in the wind in Montana after beating up your spouse.

Read more »

Ex-D.C. Homicide Commander Questions the Way Death of Justice Scalia Was Handled

Justice Antonin Scalia

Justice Antonin Scalia

By Allan Lengel
ticklethewire.com

When  Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia was found dead over the weekend at a west Texas ranch, he reportedly had a pillow over his head.

Now, the conspiracy theories are cropping up.

Sari Horowitz and Lena Sun of the Washington Post report that a former D.C. homicide commander is raising questions about how the death was handled by local and federal authorities.

“As a former homicide commander, I am stunned that no autopsy was ordered for Justice Scalia,” William O. Ritchie, former head of criminal investigations for D.C. police, wrote in a post on Facebook on Sunday.

The Post writes:

Scalia was found dead in his room at a luxury hunting resort in the state’s Big Bend region by the resort’s owner. It took hours for authorities to find a justice of the peace. When they did, Presidio County Judge Cinderela Guevara pronounced Scalia dead of natural causes without seeing the body — which is permissible under Texas law — and without ordering an autopsy.

On Sunday, the U.S. Marshals Service, which provides security for Supreme Court justices, said that Scalia had declined a security detail while at the ranch, so marshals were not present when he died. When the marshals were notified, deputy marshals from the Western District of Texas went to the scene, the service said in a statement.

Guevara said she declared Scalia dead based on information from law enforcement officials on the scene, who assured her that “there were no signs of foul play.” She also spoke to Scalia’s doctor, who told her that the justice had been to see him Wednesday and Thursday last week for a shoulder injury and that he had ordered an MRI for Scalia, according to WFAA-TV in Dallas. The 79-year-old justice also suffered from several chronic conditions, Guevara said. She said she was awaiting a statement from the physician to complete Scalia’s death certificate.

Ritchie writes:

“You have a Supreme Court Justice who died, not in attendance of a physician. You have a non-homicide trained US Marshal tell the justice of peace that no foul play was observed. You have a justice of the peace pronounce death while not being on the scene and without any medical training opining that the justice died of a heart attack. What medical proof exists of a myocardial Infarction? Why not a cerebral hemorrhage?”

To read full story click here.

Five Tough Criminal Cases for the Supreme Court in February

By Ross Parker
ticklethewire.com

Tough sledding for the Supreme Court in February with oral arguments on five thorny criminal justice cases.

Judicial Bias : What was he thinking? In Williams v. Pennsylvania the DA of Philadelphia, Ronald Castille, personally authorized the pursuit of the death penalty against Terrence Williams in connection with the office’s prosecution for a brutal murder. Williams was tried, convicted and sentenced to death. Castille supervised the direct appeal, which was denied. During post-conviction proceedings, with Castille still heading the office, a lower court found that his office had violated the Brady rule in failing to turn over exculpatory evidence during the penalty phase (that Williams had been abused along with other minors by the victim) and in presenting false argument.

Shortly thereafter Castille ran for election to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and boasted during the campaign that he had personally sent Williams and others to death row. He won the election. By the time the case reached the state supreme court, Castille had become the Chief Justice.

Incredibly, Castille refused to recuse himself from the case when the appeal arrived in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court unanimously reversed the lower court and reinstated the death sentence. Chief Justice Castille wrote a scathing concurring opinion criticizing the Defender’s Office as “ringmasters, with their parrots and puppets as a side show.”

US_Supreme_Court

Prediction: Reverse. It is astounding that this guy failed to appreciate that his direct participation in the case created a risk that he could not decide it fairly. The appearance of actual and potential bias was obvious particularly when the issue was his former office’s misconduct.

The voters should turn him out of office. He has damaged the reputation of good prosecutors and judges, as well as the reputation of the state’s highest court. The remedy for the Supreme Court is the conundrum. Merely remanding the case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court without Castille sitting on the case seems hardly enough. A different vote by the other Justices is an admission of that they were previously influenced by Castille’s involvement, but reaffirming their former votes smacks of continued injustice.

Search Attenuation Doctrine:  In Utah v. Strieff the issue is whether evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest on an outstanding warrant should be suppressed because the investigative stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

The officers had some reason after surveillance to stop the defendant’s vehicle on suspicion of drug dealing, but the information did not meet the reasonable suspicion standard. To their happy surprise, however, after the stop they learned that there was already an arrest warrant outstanding.  A search incident to that arrest produced evidence. However the Utah courts threw the evidence out and tossed the case. A great law school exam case.

Soon after the Warren Court applied the exclusionary rule to prohibit evidence resulting from unlawful police action, it became apparent that there were circumstances where the application of the rule would not serve its purpose of deterrence. Exceptions were carved out, including standing, inevitable discovery, good faith, independent source and collateral uses.

The exception at issue in Strieff is the attenuation doctrine. Evidence which would not have been obtained but for official misconduct is not inadmissible if the causal connection with the acquisition is sufficiently attenuated. If the officers acted in good faith and their actions did not affect the justification for the search, the taint of the conduct is purged. That is, unless you are a cop in Utah or Nevada.

Other jurisdictions have held that, as in Strieff, if there was no flagrant misconduct and the officer had no control over the intervening circumstances (here the existence of a warrant), the attenuation doctrine should be applied to bar the exclusionary rule’s application. The courts are all over the map on how to apply the factors of the doctrine and are badly in need of the Court’s re-direction.

Prediction: Reverse. The Utah police officers acted in good faith, were just shy of having enough information for a legal stop, and had no control over the existence of the warrant. No purpose would be served by excluding the evidence.

Hobbs Act Interstate Commerce Element:  A prosecutor friend once said that interstate commerce was the last refuge of the Hobb, meaning that if a criminal defendant in a Hobbs Act prosecution was relying on the argument that there had been no proof that the robbery affected interstate commerce, he was in desperate straits. With the principles of de minimis, depletion of assets, aggregation, and, in attempt cases, targeting, there is precious little left for a drug rip-off artist like the defendant in Taylor v. United States to rely upon for this long-shot defense.

The Court will decide if the government has to prove the interstate commerce element in Hobbs Act cases where the robbery of a drug dealer is an inherent economic enterprise affecting commerce.

Taylor broke into two houses in Roanoke, Va.,  where he thought he could rob drugs and drug proceeds. He found none and left with a few dollars and a couple cell phones. In his Hobbs Act trial he wanted to argue that robbing drug dealers of marijuana grown in Virginia would have no effect on interstate commerce and therefore the evidence was insufficient. The trial court and the 4th Circuit, however, held that drug dealing in the aggregate affects interstate commerce, particularly where a defendant targets drug dealers. Drug dealing is an enterprise which inherently satisfies the element as a matter of law.

Two other circuits (2nd and 7th) take a different approach, requiring the jury to make an individualized decision on the interstate commerce element in drug robbery cases rather than the court make a per se finding.

Prediction Affirmed:  Whether anything remains of the interstate commerce element in Hobbs Act cases involving the robbery of a drug dealer is a tough call actually.  I don’t think the Court will go as far as the 4th Circuit in Taylor. However, if the opinion is limited to the sufficiency of the evidence, Taylor did attempt to rob drug dealers, without regard to the source of their product. Affirmed by a close margin. (I’ve changed this prediction 3 times already.)

Recklessness as a Mens Rea in Unlawful Firearms Possession:  In the 4th case for February argument, Voisine v United States, the issue is whether a misdemeanor crime with a mens rea of recklessness (rather that intentional or knowing) qualifies as predicate crime of domestic violence under the federal statute barring the possession of firearms by prohibited persons.

The defendants were each convicted of misdemeanors assaults involving domestic members and were charged under the Maine statute and doing so intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.  Some years later they were found to possess rifles, one having shot a bald eagle, and convicted of illegal possession of a firearm by a prohibited person under 18 USC 921(a)(33)A .

On appeal the Supreme Court vacated the convictions and remanded for reconsideration in light of last year’s decision in Castleman. That case held that in this statute Congress intended that the actus reus (wrongful acts) of common law battery applied and noted but did not decide whether the mens rea requirement of battery (intentional not reckless) also applied to the predicate crime. The 1st Circuit reinstated the convictions and said the acts were kosher, that recklessness was an adequate mens rea, and so here we are back again with Chief Justice Roberts and Company.

Prediction:  Reverse  There are some complicating factors in the record, like the 1st Circuit finding “volitional” elements in Maine’s recklessness mental element etc. But if the Court focuses on the root issue, I think they will make the 2nd Amendment folks happy by disqualifying predicate crimes with a reckless state of mind from the federal statute. As the dissenting judge noted in the remand decision, the majority of the lower court seemed to be result-oriented in their discussion of what the law should be because of the dangers of domestic violence.

Sex Offender Registration: The fifth and mercifully the final case, Nichols v. United States, is another law school exam question. The defendants were two convicted sex offenders who lived on opposite sides of the Missouri River, one in Kansas (think 10th Circuit) and one in Missouri (8th Circuit). Both abandoned their  residences and traveled to Kansas City International Airport and flew off to live in the Phillipines without registering as a convicted sex offender in the state of their former residence. The 8th Circuit said that this was not a violation of the registration statute and the 10th naturally disagreed.

The issue before the Court is whether the registration statute (SORNA) requires sex offenders who reside in a foreign country to update his registration in the jurisdiction in which he formerly resided and, secondly, whether the statute is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch since it grants the Attorney General discretion on who to prosecute.

The case turns upon the construction of the registration statute and whether it intended to impose a federal obligation to notify the jurisdiction the offender is leaving of his departure to a new foreign residence. Although the statute does not plainly require such a notification, the 10th Circuit found one by construing the section requiring the offender to update his residence by his departure plans in the jurisdiction where he “resides.” The lower court found that this jurisdiction of where he resides included his abandoned residence in Kansas.

The federal statute was intended to impose minimum registration standards and procedures to make possible a national sex offender registry. Congress required the states to maintain a registration system, and it permitted the states to impose more stringent requirements. Only two states (West Virginia and Washington) explicitly require offenders who move to a foreign country to provide notification of that intention to the state he is leaving. The federal statute does not impose a requirement that an offender notify the jurisdiction he is leaving. That responsibility passed to the jurisdiction of his new residence. Since foreign countries are not included in the registration system, no duty to notify the former residence state is provided for.

Prediction: Affirm the 8th Circuit decision to reverse the conviction, reverse the 10th Circuit. Congress, intentionally or not, failed to clearly regulate the registration of a sex offender who leaves the U.S. to live in foreign countries, at least until and unless he returns. It could do so by legislating a notification requirement with the state the offender is leaving. Or the states could do so. But the strained statutory construction by the courts is not the way to do so.

That wraps up February. The guys and gals on the High Bench earn every penny of their $246,800 salary in these mind-bending exercises. Three either are in their 80s or will be within a month or two. Happy Birthday to Chief Justice Roberts who will be 61 this week. But don’t expect Justice Thomas to bring the cake.

Parker: Five Tough Criminal Cases for the Supreme Court in February

Ross Parker was chief of the criminal division in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Detroit for 8 years and worked as an AUSA for 28 in that office.

Ross Parker

Ross Parker

By Ross Parker
ticklethewire.com

Tough sledding for the Supreme Court in February with oral arguments on five thorny criminal justice cases.

Judicial Bias : What was he thinking? In Williams v. Pennsylvania the DA of Philadelphia, Ronald Castille, personally authorized the pursuit of the death penalty against Terrence Williams in connection with the office’s prosecution for a brutal murder. Williams was tried, convicted and sentenced to death. Castille supervised the direct appeal, which was denied. During post-conviction proceedings, with Castille still heading the office, a lower court found that his office had violated the Brady rule in failing to turn over exculpatory evidence during the penalty phase (that Williams had been abused along with other minors by the victim) and in presenting false argument.

Shortly thereafter Castille ran for election to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and boasted during the campaign that he had personally sent Williams and others to death row. He won the election. By the time the case reached the state supreme court, Castille had become the Chief Justice.

Incredibly, Castille refused to recuse himself from the case when the appeal arrived in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court unanimously reversed the lower court and reinstated the death sentence. Chief Justice Castille wrote a scathing concurring opinion criticizing the Defender’s Office as “ringmasters, with their parrots and puppets as a side show.”

US_Supreme_Court

Prediction: Reverse. It is astounding that this guy failed to appreciate that his direct participation in the case created a risk that he could not decide it fairly. The appearance of actual and potential bias was obvious particularly when the issue was his former office’s misconduct.

The voters should turn him out of office. He has damaged the reputation of good prosecutors and judges, as well as the reputation of the state’s highest court. The remedy for the Supreme Court is the conundrum. Merely remanding the case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court without Castille sitting on the case seems hardly enough. A different vote by the other Justices is an admission of that they were previously influenced by Castille’s involvement, but reaffirming their former votes smacks of continued injustice.

Search Attenuation Doctrine:  In Utah v. Strieff the issue is whether evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest on an outstanding warrant should be suppressed because the investigative stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

The officers had some reason after surveillance to stop the defendant’s vehicle on suspicion of drug dealing, but the information did not meet the reasonable suspicion standard. To their happy surprise, however, after the stop they learned that there was already an arrest warrant outstanding.  A search incident to that arrest produced evidence. However the Utah courts threw the evidence out and tossed the case. A great law school exam case.

Read more »