E.
Following each trip to India, HEADLEY returned to Pakistan, met
with other co-conspirators, and provided the results of his surveillance, including
photographs, videos and oral descriptions of various locations;
F.
In or around March 2008, HEADLEY met with other co-
conspirators, and discussed potential landing sites for a team of attackers who would
arrive by sea in Mumbai, India. In or around March 2008, HEADLEY was instructed to
take boat trips in and around the Mumbai harbor and take surveillance video, which
HEADLEY did during his stay in India starting in April 2008;
G.
On November 26, 2008, and continuing through November 28, 2008,
ten attackers trained by Lashkar carried out multiple assaults with firearms, grenades and
improvised explosive devices against multiple targets in Mumbai, India, including attacks
on the Taj Mahal hotel, the Oberoi hotel, the Leopold Café, the Nariman House, and the
Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus train station, killing approximately 170 persons;
H. At various times, HEADLEY conducted surveillances of other
locations in Mumbai and elsewhere in India of facilities and locations that were not
attacked in November 2008. Those surveillances included, but were not limited to,
surveillance in March 2009 of the National Defense College in Delhi, India; and
I.
Beginning in or around late 2005, and continuing through October 3,
2009, HEADLEY and his co-conspirators concealed, misrepresented and hid, and caused
to be concealed, misrepresented, and hidden, the existence and purpose of the conspiracy
and the acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy;